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The Back Forty , 
relinquished property is allocated between the 
and exchange portions of the transaction, 
landowner's realized gain equals the amount 
(the fair market value of the and boot 
less the adjusted basis allocated to the 
As in any other § 1031 the landowner 
nizes this gain to the extent of any boot. 
Example, Bob's farm has a fair market value 
$300,000 and an adjusted basis of $60,000, 
transaction that qualifies under § 1031, Bob 
the farm for a smaller farm owned by 
Land Trust and worth $190,000, Bob also re-
ceives $10,000 in cash, Bob has made a $100,000 
charitable contribution (the fair market value of 
the relinquished property minus the fair market 
value of the property and boot The 
adjusted basis allocable to the sale element is 
$40,000, so Bob realizes $160,000 of gain. Bob 
recognizes gain to the extent of boo! 
thus Bob $10,000 in His basis 
in the new, smaller farm will be $40,000, that is, 
the adjusted basis allocable to the sale portion 
($40,000) minus the boot received ($10,000) plus 
the gain recognized ($10,000) 
As with any donation of property, 
the donor needs to be aware of the percentage limita· 
tion on charitable deductions and the possibility of 
the alternate minimum tax. See HuLLon, "Donations 
of Appreciated Property Income Tax Conse-
quences," The Back Forty, 1991 [Primer 
#3]; Wedlake, "Alternative Minimum Tax," The Back 
November ]991 [Primer #4]. For more on 
bargain see Hullon, "Bargain " The Back 
Forty, 1991 #1]. 
ConclUSion 
Given the status of land trusts, the 
possibilities for structuring § 1031 eXChanges benefi-
cia to both a land trust and an individual are infinite. 
If used effectively, § I031 can be a highly useful tool. 
Section 1031, is highly technical. It has 
many requirements and time restraints. A slight error 
by one who is ill-informed may destroy the tax-de-
ferred exchange. Moreover, the most commonly used 
transaction, the Starker can also be c 
tremely time-consuming for the parties involved, The 
itself, not including preparation, may welch 
over several months. So when embarking on a § 1031 
exchange, it is wise to consult an experienced advisor 
familiar with both tax and land conservation Issues. 
Maureen Kelly is a recent VrI'lnj'JfJ!'P 0/ 
College o/the Law. 
Agricultural Preservation: 
Protesting the Application of 
Revenue Ruling 78-384 
William T. Jlullon 
When a fand {rusts asserts an intention 10 engage 
in agricultural preservation in its application 
recognition o/tax-exempt status, it is apl 10 have its 
applicalion denied, The Internal Revenue Service's 
objections to/armland preservation as a proper exempt 
purpose are grounded in Revenue R uhng which 
ffUlinlains thnt agricultural preservation is not a proper 
cNJrilahle/unclion, In Ihe view Ihis writer, Ihe 
opinion in IMt ruling, even 1/ Originally 
valid, was vilimed the enaCiment 0/ the conservOlion 
easement legislmion (IRC in 1980, 
The argumentS advanced in the following 
"Protes(' leller have, in several aClual cases, been 
su/ficientlO persuade the Service IG reverse its position, 
A/though the leller 10 a fictional California 
land trust, and thus clfes various 
governmental policies in support of ils argument. the 
gl?neral thrust the presentation would appear to he 
applicable in any jUrisdictIOn where agricultural 
preservation is supported stale, county, andior /ocal 
policies. unless and until the SerVice 
revokes the 1978 this leller may serve as {j 
useful model/or an agricultural land trust which/aces 
initial denial or subsequent 10 ils exempi 
status, (The Protest a/so deals with a separate bUi 
frequently troublesome issue the possibility that the 
resources of the land trust may he used/or the bene/il 
of private persons: ie" the "private benefit" issue.) 
Although names, dales, and places have been 
altered 10 obscure connection to any real-life situation, 
in ali suhstantive respecls the Jeller is unexpurgated, 
September/Octobe~ 1992 
'1 he lIurk Furl., 
June II, 1992 
Internal Revenue Service 
1111 Constitution A venue 
Washington, OC 20224 
Attn: OP:E:EO:R: I 
Mr. ____ _ 
Re: Hardscrabble County Land Conservancy 
- Prorestto Proposed Denial of Recogni-
tion of Exempt Status 
Dear ___ _ 
This letter constitutes a Protest to the determina-
tion proposed in your letter of April 22, 1992, with 
res pec t to the Hardsc rabble County Land 
Conservancy's (the "Conservancy's") application for 
recognition of status as an organization described in 
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. In 
response to a letter of Zane S lUrdley, president of the 
Conservancy, dared May 9, 1992, your office ex-
tended the time for filing this Protest by thirty days, 
to June 13,1992. 
PROTEST 
I . Request For Reconsideralion. By the filing 
of this PrOlest the Conservancy expresses its inten-
tion to seek reconsideration of the denial of entiUement 
to w·exempt SLatus as an organization described in 
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Such 
den ial is proposed in a letter dared April 22, 1992 
(OP:E:EO:R: I) and signed by Rolf McLickens, Chief, 
Exempt Organization Rulings Branch. 
2. Organization's Name And Address: The 
Hardscrabble County Land Conservancy, 1431 Dry 
Gulch Boulevard , Welfare, California 95 172. 
3. Discussion Of Intended Purposes. The 
Conservancy 's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws 
define the proposed scope of its operations in respect 
of the conservation and preservation of historic prop-
enies and agricultural lands. Under its Articles, the 
Conservancy is specifically empowered to acquire, 
hold, manage and dispose of 
"Iand and interests in land in a manner designed 
to preserve, protect and enhance the agricultural, 
historical, environmental, natural wi ldlife habi-
tat, scenic and recreational values of such lands 
in conformance with the requiremenLS of Section 
501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and Sec-
September/October 1992 
tions 23701 (d) and 214 of the California Rev-
enue and Taxation Code .... " Article fII, B, (2). 
The Bylaws echo that language, and those intended 
purposes are elaborated upon in the Conservancy's 
application for exempt s talUS on Form 1023 and sub-
sequent correspondence with your office. 
The focu s of the issue in this case is upon the 
propriety of agricultural preservation as a charitable 
purpose within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of 
the Code and relevant regulations. The Conservancy 
does not maintain that mere preservation or conserva-
tion of agricultural land s, without limitation, meets 
the requirements of the statute. Rather, it is the 
position of the Conservancy that such programs, if 
designed to advance a clearly delineated governmen-
tal policy, constitute activities appropriately "chari-
table" within the meaning of the Code and regula-
tions. 
The definition of the term "charitable," as used in 
section 501(c)(3), is hardly sta tic. Over the past two 
decades all manner of organizations, not previously 
considered as candidates for exempt status (nor, in 
some cases, envisioned at all), have attained exemp-
tion under that provision, among them public interest 
law firms. organizations promOling education in 
feminist concerns, and organizations intended to edu-
cate the public on current iss ues arising out of tech-
nological innovation and change. In those cases the 
fnternal Revenue Service has shown a sensible will-
ingness to tIeat charitability as an evolutionary con-
cept, capable of embracing emerging causes orga-
nized for the common good. It is respectfully submit-
ted that, in the instant case, we have just such a 
si tuation, a cause born out of the realization that one 
of our nation's most impon3m reso urces, iLS produc -
tive farm and ranch lands, is threatened by multiple 
economic forces - principally degradation through 
incompatible (but momentarily lucrative) practices 
and convers ion to non-agricultural uses. Concern 
over the permanent loss of our agricultural resource 
base has been expressed in recent years in nearly 
every legislature of the United States, and some states, 
California among them, have provided significant 
incentives toward the preservation of agricultural lands 
and production. and disincentives to the termination 
of agriCUltural uses. 
It is the position of this Protes t, quite simply, that 
an organization which seeks to conserve and to pre-
serve agricultural properties, pursuant to clearly de-
lineated governmental policies favoring s uch pro, 
grams. is now entitled La exempt status under section 
501 (c)(3) as a charitable organization. The principal 
reason for the denial of that status, according to Mr. 
13 
\' 
I' 
, 
,. 
I 
1 
I 
I 
14 
The Back Forty . 
McLickens's leHer of 1992, is that farmland 
preservation justifies exempt sWlus only if limited to 
the preservation of significant land," a 
standard evidently drawn from Revenue Ruling 76-
204,1976-2 C.B. 152. farmland is appar-
and, where the protection of such lands 
constitutes a substantial of an organization's pro-
gram, it is deemed to fail to meet the requirements of 
section 501(c)(3) on account of its pursuit of a 
noncharitable purpose. The proposed negative ruling 
concludes on this issue that "[t]he protection of farm-
land is not a charitable purpose and this activity of 
yours is substantial in nature." 
The argument the denial of exempt 
status relies heavily upon Revenue Ruling 78-384, 
1978-2 c.s. 174. In that case a nonprofit organiza-
tion which owned farmland and restricted the use or 
that land to or other uses deemed ecologi-
cally suitable was held not to be a "charitable" orga-
nization in the sense" of that 
term. Preservation alone, without a showing of eco-
logical significance, is found insufficient to meet the 
statutory standard, and the public benefit derived from 
the organization's 
land" is neither so direct nor so 
the requirements of the 
table purposes. § 1.50 I 
It is submined, first, that the proposed activities 
of the Conservancy are 
the proposed function of the 
in Revenue Ruling and that Congres~ 
slonal action to the prom ulgation of thaI 
ruling undermines its As amply described in 
prior correspondence (see, Mr. Sturdley's 
leuer of December 6, 1991), the Conservancy is not 
merely to place restrictions upon land it al-
ready holds in order to insure the perpetuation of 
agricultural activities, bUl rather to through 
various legal mechanisms, the of highly 
productive agricultural lands pursuam to clearly de-
lineated local and swte conservation 
The crucial distinction between the situa-
tion of the Conservancy and that of the organil3tion 
described in Revenue Ruling 78-374 is that the Con-
servancy will determine the feasibi and propriety 
of its protective programs and transactions pursuanl 
to external standards, the appJ ication of which insures 
the public benefit essential to SWtus as a section 
SOl (c)(3) organization. The application of such ex-
ternal standards, in the form of delineated 
governmental policies, was sanctioned 
by Congress in 1980 with the enactment of P.L. 96-
541. 
That legislation, which defined and clarified the 
charitable contribution applicable to 
consefvalion " makes it clear 
thaI the public interest is considered to be serve{l by 
the of farmland pursuant !O de-
lineated" governmell!al standards. Code section 
I defming "conservation purpose, reads in 
part 
L'\I GENERAL For purposes of this subsec-
tion, the tenn "conservation means ~ 
(IIi) the preservation of opcn space (includ-
~='-'= and forest where such 
protection is -
(I) for the scenic 
public, or 
{I I) pursuant to a 
Federal, 
of the 
conscrva!lOn policy, and will yield a 
significant public benefit ... " (Empha-
sis added). 
Since the recipient of a qualifying easement over 
open-space land must be a governmental entity or a 
section 50 I (c)(3) organization, the Hi-
tent to allow section 501 
gage in open-~pace preservation, 
aimed agricultural resources, is 
It may have becn 
to to the enactment of P.L 
96-541, that substantial ac-
tivities provided a ground upon which the Service 
categorically deny exempt status. Bm with tile 
enactment of the statute quoted has 
forced a refinement of the issue: Do the Conservancy's 
proposed preservation activities advance 
a sufficiently well-defined governmental policy fa-
voring farmland \'(mscrvation and preservation') 
Attached to this Protest are eight Exhibits reprl'-
California and Hardscrabble 
tion relevant to that issue. The 
as bear upon the present 
summarized as follows: 
Exhibit I California Constitution, Arlie Ie X ll!. 
uneq uivocally SLates a pub e 
!!1 favor of. among other purposes, the "usc 
or cons<..'rvation of natural resources, or production of 
f ooel or fi bcr 
Exhibit 2 California Revenue and TaxtlLiofl 
California htls seen fit to accord lax relicf In 
respect of the creation of "agricultural 3S 
defined in Sectilln 421 (a). Note m this 
connection the rebuttable presumption or Section 430 
thaI "the presem use of open-space land which is 
September/October 1 
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enforceably restricted and devoted LO agricultural use 
is its highes t and best agricultural use." 
Exhibit 3 - California GovernmentCode. Open-
Space Easement Act of 1974. This legis lation pro-
vides the means by which any county or c ity may 
acquire or approve an open-space easement in perpe-
tuity or for a term of years "for the purpose of pre-
serving and maintaining open space." Section 51070. 
The legislative findings leading to this Act include 
concern that " the rapid growth and spread of urban 
development is encroaching upon, or eliminating open-
space lands which are necessary not only for the 
maintenance of the economy of the state. bUl also for 
the assurance of the continued availability of land for 
the production of food and fiber .... " Section 51071. 
In order LO amplify the effects of this legislation, 
nonprofit. nongovernmental organizations approved 
by ci ties or counties are qualified recipients of open-
space easements. Section 5IOS3.5. 
Exhibit 4 - California Government Code 
§65560(bl and 6556 I. These Government Code pro-
visions . defining "open-space land," again evidence 
the legislature's concern for the maintenance of agri · 
culturally productive resources , and ilS intent ion Lo 
discourage "premature and unnecessary conversation 
of open-space land to urban uses" as "a malter of 
public interes t. " Section 65561(a). (b) . 
Exhibit 5 - California Government Code, The 
"Williamson Act". Property tax relief under 
California's Williamson Act has been availed of by 
thousands of farmers and ranchers who contract to 
maintain their properties in agricultural use in ex.-
change for propeoy tax assessments based upon agri-
cultural values. Few states have made such a sub-
stantial funded (via tax relieQ co mmitment La agri-
cultural preservation. The policy which generated 
[hat commitment is reOected in the legislative find-
ings at Section 51220, including recognition of the 
dangers LO agricultural lands in a "rapidly urbanizing 
society ." Section 51220(c), (d) . The legislature has 
also found [hat "agricultural land trusts represent a 
promising method of preserving productive agricul-
tural lands without the direct intervention of staLe or 
local land use regulations. " Section 51 296. 
Exhibit 6 - California Government Code Sce-
nic Easement Deed Act of 1959. This re la tive ly early 
Act ev inces the same concern for the preservation of 
open space as do the later and mOfe specific acts 
cOnstitUling the previous exhibits. Even in this early 
legisl ation, it was contemplated that governmental 
interests might be served by the acquisition of prop-
eoy in fee , with a conveyance or leaseback La an 
original owner, under an arrangemenllimiting the use 
September/October 1992 
of the subject property. The Conservancy's ex pressed 
intemion LO acquire threatened agricultural lands in 
fee, to attach perpetual conservation resuic tions, and 
then LO lease such properties at their agricultural fair 
rental value is precisely consonant with the legislative 
declara tion in 1959. Section 6953. 
EXhibit 7 - California Civil Code. Conservation 
Easements. In 1979 the legisla ture passed enab ling 
legislation recognizing the conservation easement as 
a valid and perpetual interest in land, not requiring 
appurtenant fee ownership or affinnative use rights . 
Section SI5.2. The definitional provis ion, Section 
S 15 .1, contains specific approval of conveyances of 
conservation easements for the retention of land " pre. 
dominantly in iLS ... agricu ltural ... condition ." 
ExhibitS County of Hardscrabble General Plan 
Amendments. The Service has previously been fur-
nished, as an attachment LO Mr. Sturdley's leuer of 
December 6, 1991 , excerpts from the Hardscrabble 
County General Plan , as amended . Those excerpts 
amply demonstrate extreme govemmenLaI sensitivity 
to the environm e ntal issues to which the 
Conservancy 's programs will be addressed. On De-
cember 4, 1990, the Board of Supervisors for 
Hardscrabble County adopted certain amendments LO 
the General Plan, specifically intended to strengthen 
and suppon agricultural preservation effons, part icu-
larly as La lega ll y s ubdivided lands the development 
of which would be incompatible with the County's 
General Plan. Private conservation organizalions are 
prominently mentioned in these amendmentS as alter-
naLive rec ipienLS of voluntary donations and purchas-
ers of development lights; see Section 29.2.5. 
The governmental polic ies recited in the statu· 
tory EXhibits to this Protest provide overwhelming 
evidence of the concern of the State of California and 
the County of Hardscrabble for the conservation and 
preserva tion of its natural resources, among them iLS 
agriculturally productive lands. These are not mere 
general expressions of aspirational programs , but 
rather a coherent and complementary statutOry scheme 
providing statements of policies, incentives, and de-
scriptions of mechanisms intended to effectuate the 
leg islative objectives described , It is hardly conceiv-
able that a private land truSt. operating within guide-
lines established by those c learly delineated govern-
mental policies. could be found not to provide a sig-
nificant public benefit through its activit ies. 
The Conservancy requests. therefore, that recon-
sideration be given to the Service's proposed finding 
that the preservation and conservation of agricultural 
lands cannot be considered a charitable purpose. The 
1980 conservation easement legislation, in conjunc-
15 
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lion with the well-defined legislative purposes soughl 
to be advanced by the Conservancy's intended pro-
gram s, sanction those programs as indubitably chari-
table in naLUre_ It would be an anomaly indeed if, 
where Congressional concern for open-space agri-
culLUral preservation is buttressed by strong and pre-
cise local policies. private conservation organizations 
were not permitted to function for lack of a perceived 
traditional charitable naLUre. 
Mr. McLickens's letter of April 22 also indicates 
that the Conservancy's programs may create more 
than an "indirect or incidental benefit" to farmers 
"involved in" the Conservancy'S programs. Although 
the Conservancy certainly intends to engage in agri-
cultural preservation efforts, as described above, it 
has no intention whatsoever of creating situations in 
which the private inurement of farmers or ranchers is 
effected. 
Agricultural landowners who transfer properties, 
or interests in properties. to the Conservancy will 
receive no more than fair market value. 1n acquiring 
lands in fee by purchase, the Conservancy will pay no 
more than fair market value, and for the Service [0 
conclude on the basis of such a proposed transaction 
that the transferor was improperly advantaged would 
be to deny, by analogy, the right of an art collector to 
sell a painting to an exempt mu seum at fair market 
value, or the right of an urban landowner to sell his 
property to a school or hospital for a fair price. The 
"inurement" rule contains no such proscription, and 
in nO case or ruling has it ever been suggested that a 
publicly supported charitable organization cou ld nOt 
deal at fair market value and at arms' length with 
owners of properly sought to be acquired for its proper 
charitable purposes. 
The confusion on this issue may involve a some-
what different transaction, the donation or purchase 
from an agriculLUral landowner of an casement re-
Slricting the uses of the subject properly. That silUa-
tion is not concepLUally different from the purchase in 
fee, but since the acquisition is of rights essentially 
negative in character (i.e., the power to proscribe 
certain defined uses but not affirmatively to use the 
subject properly), it may appear lhal the transferor 
has received an unwarranted benefit. 
The perception is illusory. Regulations adopted 
under the conservation easement legislation (PL 96-
541) discussed above permit a charitable contribution 
deduction in the amount of the diminUlion in value of 
the property subject to the easement. Reg. § 1.170A-
14(h)(3). In the contribution situation, the regula-
tions properly recognize thal the donor has conveyed 
a bundle of property rights properly valued aecording 
to the properlY's reduction in value. Where the Con-
servancy receives an easement by donation over land 
legally subdividable into one-acre lOts, for example, 
and the easement restricts the subsequent use of the 
properly to exclusively agricultural pursuits, the 
landowner has clearly parted with value, and the cited 
regulation accords him an income La x deduction. 
Similarly. were the landowner (0 have so ld such a 
proscriptive easemenl. he would be entitled to re-
ceive. and the Conservancy emitled to pay, an am OUnl 
representing the fair market value of that transferred 
interest - again the diminution in value of the prop-
erty. Private inurement in such a scenario simply 
does not arise; the activities of the Conservancy are 
exclusively aimed at the production of public benefit , 
and acquisitions from landowners through donations 
or Via purchases nOt in excess of f;.lir market value can 
hardly be said to confer any unwarranted benefit to 
participating landowners. Purchase of a conservation 
easement at fair market value docs not enhance the 
personal balance sheet of the sel ling farmer whatso· 
ever, it merely transforms one or more attributes of 
land (e.g . development rights) into a different asset 
(the consideration received). In no sense have the 
assets or the income of the organization been used for 
the seller 's benefit , but merely to acquire an asset to 
be used to advance the organization's proper exempt 
purposes. 
Finally, Mr. McLickens's leller addresses lhe 
possibility o f qualification under Section 501 (c)(3) as 
an organization which "lessens the burdens of gov-
ernment." Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(2). Thalleller re-
ciles that there is "no information to indicate (hal 
Hardscrabble Cou nty and/or the State of California is 
involved in the active operation of farms," and the 
Con servancy certainly docs not base its application 
upon any such contemion . But the ruling goes on to 
state that " [f]arming or the preservation of farmland 
is not a traditional governmental function," and that 
" [the Conservancy is] therefore not lessening the bur· 
dens of government." 
Although farming per sc is assuredly nOt cither a 
LIaditional Or current govcrnmental function, (he 
preservation of agricultural land is certainly viewed 
as a high governmental priority in the State of Cali-
fornia and in Hardscrabble County, as the SlalUlory 
evidence referenced in the attached exhibits amply 
demonstrates. The 1990 amcndments to the 
Hardscrabble County General Plan, in particular, en-
vision a symbiosis between governmental planning 
and private non-profit cffectualion which is designed 
to produce a public benefi t in lhe form of Ihe mainte-
nance of open-space lands and agricultural productiv. 
September/October 1992 
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ity. While perhaps not "traditional," the efforts of the 
Conservancy to funher the governmental objectives 
of the State of California and of Hardscrabble County 
will undeniabl y serve to produee a public benefit and 
thus to lessen the obligations of government to 
shoulder the entire burden of land use planning through 
loning. eminent domain, and other non-cooperative 
devices. 
Times change. So too, must the concept of 
charitability, as reflected in the Internal Revenue 
Service's frequent recognition of exempt status for 
organizations outside the nonprofit "m ai nstream. " 
Fortunately, as the evolution of American philan-
thropy well proves, the Service has shown an admi-
rable capaci ty to recognize emerging public concerns 
and to accord exempt status to organizations formed 
to address them . 
The Conservancy asks for no more than a careful 
reconsideration of its proposed programs and objec-
tives in light of the views expressed above. We 
believe that upon such reconsideration you will con-
clude that: (I ) the conservation of agricultural lands 
pursuant to clearly de lineated governmental policies 
may indeed constitute a proper charitable purpose, 
within the meaning of section 501(c)(3); (2) no im-
permissible private benefit will be conferred upon 
any landowner who tran sfers property . or interests in 
property, to the Conservancy for an amount not ex-
ceeding the fair market value of that property or those 
interests; and (3) through the pursuit of its intended 
land preservation activities, the Conservancy will ad-
vance the interests of the State of California and the 
County of Hardscrabble, and thus lessen the burdens 
of government. 
If, upon recon sideration, you conclude that a fa-
vorable ruling cannot be issued, a conference in your 
office is respectfully requested. A power of attorney 
authorizing the undersigned and one other to repre-
sent the Conservancy in thi s maller is enclosed here-
with. 
Sincerely yours, 
Beowulf Q. O'Shaunessey 
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From the Bench 
The Advantage of a Local Appraiser 
As a taxpayer attempting to maximize the value 
of a donated conservation easement, does it pay to 
hire a land use expert who is from the local area, to 
determine the value of the easement? In Clemens v. 
Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. 351 (1992), the fact that 
the taxpayer hired a planner who was familiar with 
local land use practices resulted in the Tax Court 
substantially agreeing with the taxpayer's appraisal 
of the value of Ihe easemem. 
The taxpayer ' s dispute with the IRS arose oul of 
the "before" value of the taxpayer's properly. The 
property was a 140-acre undeveloped plol of land 
localed on Martha' s Vineyard, an island off the coast 
of Cape Cod, Massachusells. The taxpayer donaled 
development rights on fort y 10 fifty acres of the prop-
erty to various qualified conservation organizations. 
Af!er the imposi tion of Ihe easemenl, the property 
was to be subdivided inlo twemY-Ihree housing lots. 
The taxpayer, in a((empting (0 maximize the assessed 
"before" value of Ihe property , asserled that the 
property's highesl and beSI "before" use would have 
been a 40-101 subdivision, were il nOI for the imposi-
tion of Ihe easement. 
The IRS argued that the taxpayer's valuation of 
Ihe "before" value of the property was grossly over-
stated. II asserted thattwenly- three lOIS, or at most 
thirl Y, would have constituted the highesl and beSI 
possible "before" use of the property, because local 
approval of a 40- 101 subdivision on Ihe properly was 
nOI al all certain. The properly was located in a 
dislriCI of "critical planning concern," with regula-
tions prohibiting construclion on hilltops or near 
roadways. Additionally, local regulations required a 
functi oning well on each lo t During preliminary 
drilling, Ihere had been considerable difficulty in 
finding adequate waler supplies on the properly. For 
these and other reasons, the IRS asserted Ihat the 
taxpayer had overstated the "before" fair markel value 
of his property, and Ihus had overstated the value of 
his donated easement. 
In ruling for the taxpayer, the Tax COurl gave 
su bstantial weight to the faetthal Ihe taxpayer's valu-
ation was supported by Ih e lestimony of a local plan -
ner and former director of the local planning com-
mission. The IRS 's valualion expert, on the olher 
hand, had offices in Seekonk, Massachuse((s, and 
Pawtuckel, Rhode Island , thiflY to forty miles to the 
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